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Introduction
To maintain individual and collective welfare, human society 
relies on formal and informal institutions of justice that enforce 
norms and punish norm violations. Punishing an individual 
for norm violations depends on whether they were the agent of 
that action and responsible for it (Frith, 2014). To be protected 
against punishment, individuals delegate decision to others, 
deferring responsibility and blame for an unfair behaviour 
(Bartling & Fischbacher, 2012). An alternative way to shift the 
blame for an unfair choice is to share, rather than delegate, respon-
sibility by making the decision collectively. Research on collec-
tive decisions has primarily focused on the benefits of collective 
decisions in terms of outcome improvement, however, neglect-
ing another facet: for an individual, being in a group could be a 
good way to reduce responsibility and thereby, the associated 
punishments for norm violations (El Zein et al., 2019). Perform-
ing an action as a group distributes the responsibility among group 
members and also makes it harder to determine who did what. 
When the group structure is not sufficiently transparent (Duch 
et al., 2011; Forsyth et al., 2002; Gerstenberg & Lagnado, 2012), 
it seems likely that the severity of punishment for the collective 
as compared to the individual will decrease. Therefore, avoiding 
punishment may represent a strong motivation to join a group 
decision (El Zein et al., 2019).
Indirect empirical evidence supports this hypothesis that being 
in a group could help shift the blame and avoid punishments. 
People are more likely to display free-riding behaviors in groups 
(Morgan & Tindale, 2002; Tindale & Kameda, 2017; Wildschut 
et al., 2003), possibly thinking they might get away easier with 
their act as a group. Also, a group is judged less responsible 
(Waytz & Young, 2012) and punished less severely (Newheiser 
et al., 2012) when perceived as a collection of distinct agents 
(low-cohesive group) than as a unified agent (high-cohesive 
group).
Here we aimed to directly test the hypothesis that norm viola-
tions and their punishments differ in collective vs individual 
decisions. Based on the hypothesis that shared responsibility 
in groups reduces punishment and blame (El Zein et al., 2019) 
we developed an experimental paradigm to test two key hypoth-
eses: (1) Participants are more likely to violate norms when they 
are in a group. (2) For the same level of norm violation, groups 
are less likely (vs individuals) to receive punishment. To do so, 
we adapted well-known behavioural economic games, which 
provide valuable experimental paradigms to measure individu-
al’s cooperative behaviours and responses to fairness-based norm 
violations. These games have repeatedly shown that humans 
cooperate with unrelated strangers in one-off encounters and bear 
personal costs to punish others who violate norms (Fehr & 
Fischbacher, 2004).
In our adapted versions of the ultimatum game (UG) and the dic-
tator game with third-party punishment (TP-DG), individuals or 
groups of three individuals could split their allocated points with 
receivers. In the UG, the receiver could reject an unfair offer 
which results in all players receiving zero points. This rejec-
tion is considered as a form of social punishment of the proposer 
and seems to reflect an emotional reaction (Sanfey et al., 2003) 
and signal of fairness needs (Camerer & Thaler, 1995). In the 
TP-DG, a third-party can punish an unfair offer at their own cost. 
Even though unaffected by the norm violation, third parties dis-
play this cooperative behaviour which has been suggested to be 
driven by fairness needs similarly as in second-party punishment 
(Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004). In addition to these two adapted 
games, we re-analysed available data from a previous study 
(Rand et al., 2009) that involved a public goods game between 
four players with punishment to test whether the use of 
punishment changes with the number of people defecting.
Applying our key two hypotheses described above to the experi-
mental paradigm, we predicted that 1) an individual in the 
group will offer less than the same individual alone, and make 
his/her decision faster, 2) the group will be punished less than 
the individual and punishment decisions facing a group will 
be slower reflecting a more hesitant choice, and 3) Inflicting pun-
ishment on unfair contributions will decrease with the number of 
people defecting. We further investigated individual differences 
in norm violations and their punishment by collecting scales 




A total of 150 healthy participants (79 females, mean age= 
23.2±4.2) completed the experiment. The eligibility criteria were: 
1) participants aged 18-35 and 2) have no reported history of neu-
rological or psychiatric disorders. This sample size was decided 
based on a previous economic games study that we re-analysed 
here (Rand et al., 2009). The punishment treatment in the study 
included 40 participants. Given our 4 conditions of interest (indi-
vidual or group proposers in the proposer or the punisher role), 
we multiplied this number by 4 and could test 150 participants. 
The study took place in November 2017 (first 80 participants – 
part of a master’s thesis of the second author; recruitment post-
poned for timing issues) and May 2018 (70 participants) at 
the Psychology Department testing cubicles (26 Bedford way, 
University College London (UCL)). Participants were recruited 
through the UCL SONA Psychology Pool. It consists of a plat-
form managed by UCL where the experimenter suggests experi-
ment dates that participants receive by email and register to. 
Participants provided written consent according to regulations 
approved by the UCL ethics committee (Project ID Number: 
4223/002 and ICN-AH-PWB-3-3-2016c). They were informed 
that they would receive £7.50 for their participation and could 
receive a bonus up to £2.5 based on their gains. All participants 
were accorded the bonus and compensated £10.
Experimental design and procedure
Participants were recruited in groups of 7 to 11 individuals 
with mixed gender. They briefly met each other before enter-
ing separate cubicles to begin the experiment. After they com-
pleted practice trials, a message instructed them to wait for the 
experimenters to launch the experiments so that everyone starts 
together. This setting was used to make participants believe they 
were playing together. The experiment was adapted from two 
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well-known economic games: the Ultimatum Game (UG) and 
the Dictator game with third-party punishment (TP-DG) 
(Figure 1).
Ultimatum game (UG). This game includes 2 roles: the pro-
poser and the receiver. In our rendition of the game, a proposer 
was given 10 points. S/he then decided how to split the 10 points 
between themselves and a receiver. The receiver, in turn, could 
accept or reject the offer. If accepted, each player received the 
points allocated to them by proposer. If rejected, both players 
received zero points. Rejection of an offer is a costly choice and is 
explained as a social punishment of the proposer by the receiver.
Dictator game with third-party punishment (TP-DG). This 
game includes 3 roles: a proposer, a receiver and a third-party 
punisher. The proposer was initially given 10 points. S/he then 
decided how much of 10 points she wanted to give the receiver, 
and how much to keep. The third-party, who had been allocated 
5 points, observed the transaction. S/he had the choice to spend 
one of her points to reduce the proposer’s overall outcome by 30%. 
The third party did not make any material gain from this choice. 
Reducing the proposer’s gain, therefore is a form of costly social 
punishment as the third-party loses a point in order to punish a 
player who acted unfairly.
Key experimental conditions. In both games, we added a vari-
ation to the main paradigm to include conditions where groups 
(proposers) make the offers to the receiver. This condition con-
sisted of a group of 3 individuals making a collective offer. Par-
ticipants were informed that the group offer was an average of 
individual offers. They were told that punishment of the group 
offer would reduce each member’s pay-off directly and did not 
consist of a split of points among group members.
For example, in the UG, if the average group offer was 4, each 
member of the group kept 6 points if the offer was accepted. If 
the offer was rejected, everyone received zero points. In the 
TP-DG, if the average group offer was 4, each member of the 
group kept 6 points if the third-party did not punish them. If pun-
ished by third-party, each member of the proposer group received 
4 points (i.e. 6 points reduced by 30% and rounded to nearest 
integer).
Design. All participants completed 60 one-shot interaction tri-
als in total and played all roles in both games. The trials were 
played anonymously assuring that participants could not build 
reputations that might influence their decisions. While partici-
pants were told they were playing online together, we computed 
all the interactions, and everyone did the same experiment (with 
randomized order of rounds for each participant).
Conditions of interest consisted of 48 trials, where partici-
pants played either receiver in UG (24 trials) deciding whether 
to accept or punish offers or the third-party punisher in TP-DG 
(24 trials). In these trials, offers were perceived to have been 
made by three individuals (group condition) on half of the times 
(12 trials) and by one individual (individual condition) in the 
other half. The participants did not know that these offers 
were algorithmically generated so that they ranged from 0 
to 5 (each repeated twice within each individual and group 
condition) and therefore primarily consisting of unfair offers.
Participants also completed 12 trials in which they played the 
other roles. This included playing the proposer in the UG and 
TP-DG where they selected a number (out of ten, on the com-
puter keyboard) to offer to the receiver. They played twice as an 
individual proposer and twice as a group of proposers in both 
Figure 1. Experimental design. (a, b) In both games, 1 proposer and a group of 3 proposers had to split points between themselves and a 
receiver. a) In the Ultimatum Game, the receiver could accept or reject the offer in which case no one received any points. b) In the dictator 
game with third party punishment, the receiver could not do anything, but a third party punisher could punish the proposer(s) by making them 
lose 30% of their points at their own cost, i.e. losing 1 from their allocated 5 points.
Page 4 of 12
Wellcome Open Research 2019, 4:139 Last updated: 23 SEP 2019
games. They also played the receiver in the TP-DG in which 
they received an offer but could not respond (twice receiving 
the offer from an individual proposer and twice from a group of 
proposers). For these conditions, the other players’ choices were 
computed as follows: The proposers offers were randomly gener-
ated numbers between 0 and 6. The decisions to reject offers in 
UG or punish in TP-DG were based on the participant’s offer 
(or the mean offer with the other two simulated offers): if the 
offer was between 0 and 4, then there was a 50% chance it will 
get rejected/punished. If the offer was 5 or more then it was 
accepted/not punished.
Before starting the experiment, participants completed a prac-
tice with one round in each of the condition (five possible roles 
played in the group and individual condition – ten practice 
trials total).
Trial structure. At each round, participants first saw which game 
they were paying for 5 seconds: the image depicted all the pos-
sible roles with the role they were assigned to on that round 
framed with a black rectangle. The points each player had was 
also reminded at each round. If they were in a group condition, 
three proposers appeared on the screen.
If they were playing the proposer role:
They were asked: How much would you like to offer? They 
could press a number on the keyboard to make their offer within 
4 seconds. A spinner then appeared on the screen for ~5 seconds 
and it was written: You offered (or you and the 2 other play-
ers offered in the group condition) [amount offered], the 
receiver (UG) or the punisher (TP-DG) is making a choice. Then 
they saw what the receiver or punisher decided: ‘The receiver 
accepted’ or ‘rejected’/ ‘The proposer(s) was/were punished’
If they were playing the receiver role in UG or the third-party 
punisher:
They first saw a spinner for about ~5 sec and it was written: 
The proposer is (or the 3 proposers are) making an offer. 
Second, the proposed offer was written: The proposer offered 
[amount offered]. 
Third, they were asked:
Would you like to accept the offer? (if receiver in UG) or 
Would you like to punish the proposer? (if punisher in TP-DG) 
They could press ‘Y’ for Yes or ‘N’ for No on the keyboard to 
give their answer. They had 4 seconds to make their choice.
If they were the receiver in the TP-DG, they observed what was 
happening, with spinners while proposer(s) made an offer and 
when the punisher was decide whether to punish or not, and 
the outcomes of each stage.
At the end of each round, participants were shown the outcomes 
for each player below the image depicting the player for 5 seconds 
(for example: The proposers each keep 6 – The receiver 
gets 4 – The punisher keeps 5)
The exact timeline of each round can be observed by following 
the link to the online experiment:
https://www.ucl.ac.uk/icn-crowd-cognition/Marwa/gamesexp/ 
rungames.html
Incentives. Participants were told that they would have the 
chance to win a bonus and receive up to an additional £2.5 on 
the basis of their outcome in a randomly selected trial at the end 
of the experiment (with 1 point=0.25pounds). This made sure 
that every trial counted for towards the participant’s earning and 
helped to make sure that they keep focused in all 60 trials.
Questionnaires. Online questionnaires (using www.qualtrics.
com/) were sent to the participants via email and filled out 
before the day of the experiment. Participants had to respond to 
these questionnaires in order to be eligible to participate in the 
experiment; however, they were not selected based on these 
scales in order to fit different groups. The questionnaires meas-
ured social value orientation (SVO) (Murphy et al., 2011), self-
reported political identification (POI) (from extreme left to 
extreme right) and psychopathy traits extracted from The Dark 
Triad Scale (Paulhus & Williams, 2002). We checked whether 
these three different scales co-varied with the four dependent 
variables: mean offers proposed OFF, mean punishment PUN, 
difference in offer between group and individual OFFDIFF, and 
difference in punishment given to a group vs individual 
PUNDIFF, and the associated reaction times (RTs). We also 
checked the relation between the scales and these variables 
separately in the UG and TP-DG.
Statistical analyses. Analyses were performed using MATLAB 
(R2016b). Non-parametric analyses were performed as all 
data (offers made as proposers, proportion punishment and 
reaction times) were not normally distributed (Kolmogorov- 
Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests rejecting the null hypothesis 
that the data come from a normal distribution). These analyses 
include the Wilcoxon signed-rank test, Friedman test, Spearman 
correlations and generalized linear mixed-effects models. Effect 
size (r) for Wilcoxon tests are reported, calculated as: r = Z/sqrt(N) 
with N = number of observations.
Re-analysis of data from the public goods game. To investigate 
whether punishment use decreases with the number of defec-
tors (3rd prediction in the introduction) in the public goods game, 
we reanalyzed available data from a previous study (Rand 
et al., 2009) that involved a PGG between four players with pun-
ishment (Figure 5a). We tested our third prediction that inflict-
ing punishment on unfair contributions will decrease with the 
number of people defecting by examining the use of punishment 
at each played round as a function of the number of people defect-
ing (rather than the number of people giving an offer as we did 
in our experimental setting). We considered as defectors the 
players who gave less than the mean amount of contribution 
at each round.
We performed a mixed model to test the hypothesis that punish-
ment option (1 if any punishment is used, i.e., punishing 1 or 
more players, 0 if no punishment) was predicted by number of 
defectors. The number of defectors at the round, the player’s 
contribution and the group’s payoff were entered as fixed-effect 
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Two independent variables could influence the offers made by 
proposers and reaction times to make the offers: the game (Ulti-
matum Game UG or Dictator Game with third party punish-
ment DG-TP) and the group condition (Individual proposer 
IND or group proposer GRO).
Proposer offers. Offers made in the UG correlated with those 
made in the DG-TP (ρ =0.60, p<0.001) confirming that people 
who are generous in one game were also generous in the other. 
Moreover, higher offers were made in UG as compared to 
DG-TP (Z = 3.86, p < 0.001, r = 0.22).
To test our first hypothesis, that an individual in the group will 
offer less than the same individual alone, we turn to the effect 
of group condition on offers. Confirming our hypothesis, a main 
effect of group condition was observed with higher offers made 
by participants as individual proposers (IND) as compared 
to being part of a group of proposers (GRO) (Z = 2.23, 
p = 0.025, r = 0.12) (Figure 2a). The difference between IND 
and GRO did not significantly differ between games (Z = 0.67, 
p = 0.49, r = 0.03). Interestingly, the offer difference between 
IND vs GRO correlated negatively with the mean offer made 
by each participant in all conditions (Spearman correlation 
ρ = -0.251, p = 0.002) (Figure 2b). This correlation persisted 
within each game: In the UG, the difference between IND and 
GRO co-varied with the mean offer in UG (ρ = -0.31, p < 0.001) 
and the mean offer in TP-DG (ρ = -0.18, p = 0.02). In the 
TP-DG, the difference between IND and GRO co-varied with 
the mean offer in TP-DG (ρ = -0.19, p = 0.01) and the mean 
offer in UG (ρ = -0.16, p = 0.04). In other words, individuals 
who tended to make overall lower offers (regardless of the game 
played) diminished their offers even further when in a group, 
suggesting that the group condition was compatible with the 
individual’s intention to make less generous offers.
To further understand this finding, we categorized people as 
low proposers and high proposers using a median split in each 
of the games separately. Using the split based on the UG, 
we checked whether there was a difference between IND and 
GRO in low vs high proposers in the TP-DG: A significant effect 
appeared only for low proposers (Z = =2.04, p = 0.04, r =0.16), 
but not high proposers (Z =-0.61, p = 0.53, r =0.04, difference 
between the two types of proposers – low vs high proposer Z=1.9, 
p=0.05, r=0.15) (Figure 2c). Similarly, using the split based on 
the TP-DG, we checked whether there was a difference between 
IND and GRO in low vs high proposers in the UG: A signifi-
cant effect appeared only for low proposers (Z =3.16, p = 0.001, 
r =0.25), but not high proposers (Z =-0.23, p = 0.81, r =0.01, dif-
ference between the two types of proposers Z=2.83, p=0.004, 
r=0.23) (Figure 2c).
Reaction times to make offers. To test the second part of our 
first hypothesis that an individual in the group will make his/her 
Figure 2. Offers made in the proposer role. (a) Mean offers over both games made individually (yellow) or as a group (green). (b) Difference 
in offers made individually or as a group as a function of mean offers over both games. (c) Offers in each game as a function of a selection 
made in the other game: Left panel, offers in the third-party dictator game (TP-DG) separated by those who gave low or high offers in the 
Ultimatum Game (UG). Right panel, offers in the UG separated by those who gave low or high offers in the TP-DG. ** p<0.01, *p<0.05; ns, 
non-significant.
Page 6 of 12
Wellcome Open Research 2019, 4:139 Last updated: 23 SEP 2019
decision faster as compared to the same individual alone, we 
turn to the differences in reaction times between the conditions. 
No main effect of game (p=0.18) or group (p=0.45) was observed. 
But there was an interaction between the two factors (Z = 2.72, 
p = 0.006, r=0.16): Reaction times were faster for decisions 
within a group as compared to individually only in the TP-DG 
(Z = -2.65, p = 0.008, r=0.15) and not in the UG (Z = -1.47, 
p = 0.14, r=0.08). The second part of our first hypothesis was 
confirmed, but only when third-party and not second party 
punishment was involved.
To conclude on the proposer role, participants gave lower offer as 
a group vs alone, and were faster to do so in the dictator game. 
This suggests that participants were expecting less punish-
ment when playing in a group as compared alone. Are groups 
indeed punished less than individuals for the same norm vio-
lation and is the decision to punish a group as compared to one 
individual more (time) costly?
Punishment
Three independent variables could influence punishment: 
the amount of offers proposed (0 to 5), the game (UG or 
DG-TP) and the group condition (Individual proposer IND or 
group proposer GRO).
Proportion punishment. Proportion punishment in the UG 
correlated with proportion punishment in the DG-TP (ρ = 0.64, 
p < 0.001), suggesting that participants show a consistent pat-
tern of punishment in different contexts, here second-party 
and third-party punishment. Proportion punishment also cor-
related with the amount of offers in the proposer role (ρ = 0.44, 
p < 0.001), showing that those who were more generous as 
proposers were also more prone to punish smaller offers 
(Figure 3b). Similarly as for the proposed offers, there was more 
overall punishment in the UG than in the TP-DG (Z = 2.46, 
p = 0.014, r=0.14), consistent with a previous experiment 
directly comparing second- and third party punishment (Fehr & 
Fischbacher, 2004).
A main effect of offers was observed, with punishment increas-
ing as the offers decreased (Friedman test χ2 =517.18, p < 0.001) 
(Figure 3a). Contrary to our second hypothesis however, there 
was no main effect of group condition on proportion punishment 
(Z = 0.37, p = 0.7, r = 0.02) and no interaction between group 
and game.
Reaction times for punishment decision. Confirming the sec-
ond part of our second hypothesis, participants were slowed 
down to make their punishment decisions when facing a group of 
Figure 3. Punishment decisions. (a) Proportion punishment as a function of the amount of offers proposed, green= for punishment of group, 
yellow= for punishment of individual. (b) Proportion punishment as a function of mean offers. (c) Reaction times for punishment decisions 
separated for the individual (yellow) and group (green) condition in the Ultimatum game (left panel, UG) and the third party punishment 
dictator game (right panel, TP-DG). *** p<0.001, * p<0.05; ns, non-significant.
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proposers as compared to an individual proposer (Z = 3.33, 
p=0.001, r=0.19). They were also slower to respond in the TP-DG 
as compared to the UG (Z = -9.33, p < 0.001, r=0.53). An inter-
action was observed between these group condition and games: 
the difference between reaction times for individuals vs groups 
was more important in the UG as compared to the TP-DG (Z = 
1.96, p=0.04, r=0.11), with a significant difference between 
decision time for GRO vs IND only in UG (Z = 4.19, p < 
0.001, r=0.24) and not in TP-DG (Z = 1.22, p = 0.22, r=0.07) 
(Figure 3c). This shows that participants were slowed down 
to make a decision when receiving an offer from a group vs an 
individual, only when they were directly receiving the offer. 
The slowing down for making a decision when facing a group vs 
individual proposer was true even for very low offers, i.e., 0 and 
1 (Z = 1.98, p = 0.04, r=0.11), excluding the interpretation that 
the slowing down is due to avoiding the punishment of fair par-
ticipants trapped in group with unfair partners as for offers of 0 
and 1, every member of the group surely offered low amounts. 
Moreover, the difference in reaction times for IND vs GRO was 
only significant for punishment decisions of unfair offers (30% 
or less (Sanfey et al., 2003), so 0 to 3 here) and not fair offers 
(fair Z=1.1, p = 0.27, r=0.06; unfair Z= 3.43, p<0.001, r=0.2, dif-
ference Z=1.39, p=0.16, r=0.08). Participants were thus slowed 
down when it comes to punishing groups vs individuals who 
violated fairness norms.
Reaction times as a function of punishment or no punishment 
decision. Participants were slower to punish as compared to not 
punish in both UG and TP-DG (Z = 4.02, p <0.001, r=0.23). 
This did not interact with the main effect of group on reac-
tion times (Z=0.46, p=0.64, r=0.02). An interaction between the 
choice to punish or not to punish and the amount of offers pro-
posed was observed: When the decision was to ‘not punish’, 
reaction times were slower for low (0, 1, 2) as compared to high 
(3, 4, 5) offers (Z = 4.74, p<0.001, r=0.27). When participants 
chose to ‘punish’, the reverse was observed as choices were 
faster for low offers vs high offers (Z = -3.07, p = 0.002, r=0.17).
Individual differences
Model accounting for all three scales. We started by account-
ing for the effects of all three scales on the different vari-
ables, we entered them as predictors of these variables in a 
generalized mixed model.
The amount of offers OFF was predicted only by SVO (z 
=
 5.16, 
p <0.001; UG z = 4.38, p<0.001; TP-DG z=4.93, p<0.001) and 
not psychopathy or POI (all p>0.11). Punishment PUN was pre-
dicted by SVO only over both games (z=2.71, p= 0.007; p>0.12 
for POI and Psychopathy), but also by psychopathy in the UG 
(z = 2.37 p = 0.01; SVO z = 1.98 p=0.04; POI p=0.26). Only 
SVO significantly predicted PUN in the TP-DG in the mixed 
model  (SVO z = 2.76, p = 0.006; POI z=-1.64, p=0.1).
In the UG, the difference in punishment between groups 
and individuals PUNDIFF was predicted by psychopathy 
(z= -2.15, p = 0.03; p>0.5 for SVO and POI). Difference in 
RT for punishing groups vs individuals was predicted by POI 
(z = 2.81, p = 0.005; p>0.38 for SVO and psychopathy). Next, we 
consider each of the scales and their correlations with our 
variables of interest.
SVO. SVO separates individuals in prosocial, individualis-
tic, competitive and altruistic profiles. On the total of 150 par-
ticipants, 105 scored as prosocial, 44 as individualistic and 1 
as altruistic. Prosocials, as compared to individualistics, gave 
higher offers as proposers (over both games Z=4.42, p<0.001, 
r=0.36; UG Z=3.66, p<0.001, r=0.29; TP-DG Z=4.32, 
p<0.001,r=0.35) and punished more as second and third-party 
punishers (over both games Z=2.08, p=0.03, r=0.16; UG Z=1.39, 
p=0.16, r=0.11; TP-DG Z=2.2, p=0.02, r=0.17) (Figure 4a). SVO 
did not modulate the difference in offers and punishment between 
groups and individuals (all p>0.09). There was no difference on 
RTs to offer or punish, nor in the difference between group and 
individual conditions (all p>0.19).
Psychopathy. Psychopathy scale correlated with punishment 
in the UG (ρ = 0.2, p = 0.01), not the TP-DG (ρ = 0.03, p = 
0.66– over both games ρ = 0.12, p = 0.12). When participants 
were split into 3 (based on second and third quantile): high, 
moderate and low psychopathy, high psychopathy participants 
punished significantly more than Low psychopathy partici-
pants in the UG (Z=2.77, p=0.005, r=0.27 Figure 4b) and not in 
the TP-DG (Z = 0.41, p = 0.68, r=0.04).
Psychopathy scale also correlated with the difference in pun-
ishment of groups and individuals PUNDIFF (ρ = -0.19, 
p=0.01), but here again this was only significant in the UG 
(ρ =-0.22, p =0.005, r=; TP-DG ρ =-0.01 p=0.99). PUNDIFF 
significantly differed between Low and High psychopathy par-
ticipants in the UG only (over both games Z=2.59, p = 0.009, 
r=0.25; UG Z = 2.78, p = 0.005, r=0.27; TP-DG Z=0.19, p=0.84, 
r=0.01) (Figure 4b): In Low psychopathy, there was a higher 
proportion punishment of individuals as compared to groups 
(Z = 2.07, p = 0.03, r=0.20, UG Z=1.69, p=0.08, r=0.16; TP-DG 
Z=0.48, p=0.62, r=0.04). In High Psychopathy, there was no dif-
ference overall (Z=-1.27, p=0.2, r=0.12), but when only the UG 
was considered, it seemed like individuals were actually pun-
ished even less than groups (Z=-1.75, p=0.07, r=0.17). No cor-
relation was observed between psychopathy and reaction times 
(all p > 0.19).
The results thus show that high psychopathy participants 
rejected more offers overall, and tend to do so more from groups 
than individuals. On the contrary, low psychopathy participants 
rejected more offers coming from individual as compared to 
group proposers.
Political identification. In total, 80 participants identified as 
liberals, 19 as conservative and 51 as moderate. A correlation 
between the political identification scale (POI, 1 to 7 from very 
liberal to very conservative) and punishment was observed in 
the TP-DG (ρ =-0.17, p = 0.03), but not the UG (ρ =-0.09, p = 
0.23, over both games ρ =-0.14, p = 0.08). This shows that only 
when participants acted as third-party punisher, liberals punished 
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Figure 4. Individual differences. a) Social value orientation influence on offers (Left panel) and proportion punishment (Right panel). 
b) Psychopathy influence on proportion punishment in the ultimatum game. L-Psych: Low Psychopathy, M-Psych: Moderate psychopathy, 
H-Psych: High Psychopathy. An interaction was observed between Low and High psychopathy and the difference between individual and 
group punishment: For L-Psych, individuals are punished more than groups while for H-Psych, groups are punished more than individuals 
c) Political identification influence on reaction times for the punishment decision in the ultimatum game. Reaction times when faced 
with an individual or a group in liberals, moderate and conservatives., ~ p<0.06, *** p<0.001; ns, non significant.
more overall than conservatives (Z = -1.81, p = 0.06, r=0.18). 
This effect was however not significant when accounting for 
all scales to predict punishment with the mixed model.
POI also correlated with the PUNDIFF reaction times in the 
UG (ρ =-0.24, p = 0.002, TP-DG ρ =-0.01, p = 0.81) show-
ing that the observed slowing down for punishing groups was 
more important in liberals than in conservatives (UG Z=2.9, 
p = 0.003, r=0.29 TP-DG Z=-0.76, p=0.44, r=0.07). Indeed, 
the difference in reaction times between punishing groups 
and individuals was the strongest in liberal participants (Z =-
4.61, p<0.001, r=0.36; moderate participants Z=-1.84, p=0.06, 
r=0.18, conservatives Z=1.0, p=0.3, r=0.16) (Figure 4c). No 
other correlations were observed (p>0.2).
Reanalysis of a public good game: Punishment as a 
function of the number of defectors
The results of our study show that only when participants are 
directly concerned by an offer, the number of people giving 
that offer influenced punishment behavior: there is a consist-
ent slowing down to punish three individuals as compared to 
one individual. The effect on proportion punishment was less 
consistent: it only seemed present in participants who scored 
low on psychopathy.
The UG involved punishment by rejecting an offer, the TP-
DG involved a second step punishment that did not concern the 
third party directly. A game that combines these 2 types pun-
ishment is the public goods game (PGG) with punishment, in 
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which people can punish those who defect to a common good. 
In that case, people are directly concerned as they receive money 
from the common good (like in the UG) and they can decide 
to make a costly punishment at a second stage (like in the TP-DG).
To investigate what happens in such a context, we reanalyzed 
available data from a previous study (Rand et al., 2009) that 
involved a PGG between 4 players with punishment (Figure 5a). 
We tested our third prediction that inflicting punishment on unfair 
contributions will decrease with the number of people defecting. 
The number of defectors (from 1 to 3) decreased the probabil-
ity of using punishment (Z=-3.17, p=0.001, no=892), even when 
accounting for the group’s payoff and the players’ contribution 
(Figure 5b).
Discussion
In this paper, we investigated whether norm violations and 
their punishments differ in collective vs individual decisions. 
We predicted that collective decisions can shift the blame and 
punishment away from the individual because of shared respon-
sibility for norm violations in a group. Our results confirmed 
our prediction in three ways: 1) Participants gave less gener-
ous offers (violated more the norm) when playing alone vs in a 
group of three. They were also faster to do so in the TP-DG. 2) 
Punishing a group vs an individual for norm violations required 
more time cost as participants were slowed down to make 
the punishment decision. This was the case only in the UG in 
second-party punishment, when offers directly concerned the 
punisher. 3) Participants were less inclined to punish others for 
norm violations when the number of people committing these 
norms violations was high.
Less generous offers in the group
Our current finding that people are less generous in a group 
replicates previous studies showing that individuals in groups 
display free-riding behaviours (Morgan & Tindale, 2002; 
Tindale & Kameda, 2017; Wildschut et al., 2003). These previ-
ous studies compared groups facing groups to individuals fac-
ing individuals and showed that groups are more competitive 
(Wildschut et al., 2003), defect more in a prisoner dilemma game 
(Morgan & Tindale, 2002) and offer less in a joint decision in an 
ultimatum game (Bornstein & Yaniv, 1998). Our results comple-
ment these studies by showing that even when facing one individ-
ual, people are less generous if they are part of a group vs alone. 
Interestingly, here, we show for the first time that this decreased 
generosity in group correlates with people’s overall generosity. 
Indeed, only those who gave low offers displayed a difference 
between playing in a group or alone. This shows that the group was 
compatible with the intention of those who were less sensitive to 
the norms and violated them more.
Amount of punishment for groups vs individuals
Previous studies using economic games investigating punish-
ment behaviours in groups have looked at how a group vs an 
individual punishes norm violations. They showed that when act-
ing as third party punishers in groups or alone, groups punish less 
severely in response to norm violations because of the diffusion 
responsibility (Feng et al., 2016). In the present study, we exam-
ined how a group vs one person is punished for norm violations 
rather than how the group punishes others. Contrary to our pre-
diction that shared responsibility will also decrease the pun-
ishment of a group, we did not find any difference between 
the punishments of norm violations from one person vs a group. 
However, and in line with our prediction in our re-analysis of 
the public goods game, we did find evidence for decreased pun-
ishment with the numbers of defectors violating norms. Previous 
work has shown that a group is judged less responsible (Waytz & 
Young, 2012) and punished less severely (Newheiser et al., 2012) 
when perceived as a collection of distinct agents (low-cohesive 
group) than as a unified agent (high-cohesive group). An expla-
nation to the discrepancy in results could therefore be that in the 
public goods game, other players were perceived as a collec-
tion of individuals. On the contrary, in the current adapted ver-
sion of the UG and TP-DG the group was possibly perceived 
as an entity as participants always saw the three group mem-
bers when faced with the group and told that they can punish 
‘the group’ rather than an individual in the group.
Time cost for the punishment decision
We found that people were slowed down to punish as compared 
to not punish others for their norm violations. This suggests 
Figure 5. Re-analysis of a public good game with punishment. 
(a) Structure of the public good games in Rand et al., 2009: players 
can contribute to a common good from 0 to 20. The common good is 
multiplied by 1.6 and redistributed to all players. In a second stage, 
participants can punish others for their contributions by -12 at their 
own cost of losing 4. (b) The frequency of using punishment as a 
function of the number of defectors. **p<0.01 significant decrease 
in the frequency of punishment use with the number of defectors in 
the mixed model.
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that punishing is more costly than not punishing. It relates to a 
series of discussions on whether the selfish (here not punishing) 
or the cooperative option (here punishing) is the less costly/ 
default option for people. While some studies suggest that as 
observed here, it is more time costly to choose the coopera-
tive vs the selfish option (Krajbich et al., 2015), others suggest 
the opposite (Rand et al., 2012). These discussions were related 
to amounts of contributions in economic games (cooperative as 
high contributions and selfish as low contributions). Here we 
extend the discussion to punishment decisions, and show that 
in the context of a UG and TP-DG, people are slower to choose 
the punishment (and more cooperative) option. We importantly 
found that the punishment decisions were slower when punish-
ers were faced with groups vs individuals, suggesting that it is 
also more time costly and less intuitive to choose whether to 
punish a group. This is in line with previous findings in an ulti-
matum game showing that participants spent less time con-
sidering whether to punish or not offers from opposite race as 
compared to same race (Kubota et al., 2013). Possibly, being 
faced with an individual vs group also made decisions faster 
because of a lower group affiliation when facing an individual vs 
a group. It is important to note that this time cost effect was only 
present in second-party and not third-party punishment, sug-
gesting that it applies only if unfairness is directed toward the 
self. Participants generally showed higher punishments in sec-
ond-party vs third-party punishment, reflecting a higher emo-
tional response when being directly involved which may entail 
stronger inequity aversion and a higher need for fairness sig-
nalling (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Nowak et al., 2000). This 
higher emotional involvement could also explain why the sen-
sitivity to the group was higher in second-party vs third-party 
punishment.
Social and antisocial punishment
The amount of punishment decisions correlated with both social 
value orientation and psychopathy scale, which could at first 
glance seem contradictory. Punishment consists of a cooperative 
option as it incurs a cost on the punisher, which explains why 
prosocial vs individualistic participants (as assessed in the 
social value orientation test) show higher punishment rates in 
both second and third-party punishment. Interestingly, only in 
second-party punishment, proportion punishment also increased 
with the psychopathy scale. In the ultimatum game, punish-
ment decisions have been associated with emotional reactions 
associated with anger (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996). Higher 
punishment in higher psychopathy could thus be associated to 
increased emotional reaction and an antisocial rather than proso-
cial reaction. This is line with the suggestion that in second-
party, not third party punishment, the decision to punish need 
not to reflect only cooperative behaviours but can also be associ-
ated with antisocial spiteful motives (Jensen, 2010). Accordingly, 
our results also show that higher psychopathy is associated with 
higher punishment of the group vs the individual, while on 
the contrary in low psychopathy groups benefited from lower 
punishment as initially predicted by our shared responsibility 
hypothesis (El Zein et al., 2019).
To conclude, using cooperation economic games, we show that 
people’s attitudes related to norm violations are influenced by 
whether they were made by an individual or a group. People are 
less generous as a group, use less punishment when more peo-
ple defect the norms, and are more reluctant to punish a group 
vs an individual being unfair to them. Together, these results sup-
port the idea that groups may protect from punishments and norm 
violations, because of shared responsibility among group mem-
bers for the same acts that can reduce blame and punishments 
(El Zein & Bahrami, 2019; El Zein et al., 2019).
Data availability
Open Science Framework: Supplemental materials for 
preprint: Punishing the individual or the group for norm 
violation. https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/HPVBG (El Zein, 
2019).
This project contains the following underlying data:
• Data_punishment.csv (data for each task performed by 
each participant; a data dictionary is available in the 
Description).
Data are available under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Zero “No rights reserved” data waiver (CC0 1.0 Public domain 
dedication).
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